Is banning significance testing the best way to improve applied social science research? – Questions on Gorard (2016) by Spreckelsen, Thees F. & Van Der Horst, Mariska
  
 
 
 
 
Spreckelsen, T. F. and Van Der Horst, M. (2016) Is banning significance testing the best 
way to improve applied social science research? – Questions on Gorard (2016). 
Sociological Research Online, 21(3), pp. 95-105. 
 
   
There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are 
advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/205434/  
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 29 January 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk  
  
1/18 
Is banning significance testing the best way to 
improve applied social science research? Ȃ Questions 
on Gorard (2016) 
 
Thees F Spreckelsen & Mariska van der Horst 
Univeristy of Oxford; Univeristy of Kent 
 
Abstract 
Significance testing is widely used in social science research. It has 
long been criticised on statistical grounds and problems in the 
research practice. This paper is aǯ response to 
Gorardǯ (2016) 'Damaging real lives through obstinacy: re-
emphasising why significance testing is wrong' in Sociological 
Research Online 21(1). He participates in this debate concluding 
from the issues raised that the use and teaching of significance 
testing should cease immediately. In that, he goes beyond a mere 
ban of significance testing, but claims that researchers still doing 
this are being unethical. We argue that his attack on applied 
scientists is unlikely to improve social science research and we 
believe he does not sufficiently prove his claims. In particular we 
are concerned that with a narrow focus on statistical significance, 
Gorard misses alternative, if not more important, explanations for 
the often-lamented problems in social science research. Instead, we 
argue that it is important to take into account the full research 
process, not just the step of data analysis, to get a better idea of the 
best evidence regarding a hypothesis. 
 
Keywords: Statistical significance, Transparency, Replication, Ban, 
Hypothesis testing, Controversy. 
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Introduction 
In this paper we discuss the conclusions Stephen Gorard (2016) draws in his 
recent contribution to this journal in short: ǲǡ
even when used as intended in statistical analyses, and ȏǥȐ their widespread use 
should cease immediatelyǳ (Gorard 2016: 1.1).i We maintain that how arguments 
in the paper are put forward is unlikely to persuade applied researchers to 
change how they work. In fact, the way the arguments are presented may make 
researchers defensive of their work and therefore might make them less likely to 
change their practices. The goal of this paper is not to get into a statistical 
discussion of whether there is value in the p-value (Nicholson and McCusker 
(2016) 
ǯ), but to evaluate this discussion Ȃ and the tone in which this discussion is held Ȃ from the point of view of applied 
social science researchers such as ourselves.    
ǯ
conclusions and recommendation are supposed to follow from his arguments, 
and contrast his paper with other efforts to improve social science research. 
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Our article starts out by revisiting the original articleǯ, followed by a 
critical reflection of these arguments, and   
ǯ Ǥ
We also evaluate what this discussion means for teaching and reviewing of 
publications. This way we hope to provide an applied researcherǯ perspective 
ǯis settled.  
Damaging Real Lives (DRL)  ? revisited  
Gorard argues in his article that even when used correctly, significance testing 
based on p-values do not provide the sought after information. In his words: ǲ
work, even when used as intended in statistical analyses, and to argue that their     ǳ ȋ
  ? ? ? ?: 1.1). The arguments 
are based on three general critiques: (1) a critique of the principles of 
significance testing based on p-values, (2) a critique of how researchers use 
significance testing, and (3) a critique of the wider culture of significance (in    ǲ-val ǳ (Gorard 2016: 2.3)) in all academic domains 
that perpetuates the use of significance testing. Gorard uses these points to 
conclude that the use of significance testing is ethically wrong. We will briefly 
summarize these arguments.   
 
A large part of the arguments against significance testing in the work of Gorard is 
based on the often-stated ǲ ǳ-fallacy (Gorard 2016: 3.7). This 
refers to the incorrect use of the conditional probability that the data is true 
given the null-hypothesis (D|H0) to make inferences about whether the null-
hypothesis is true given the data (H0|D). One cannot reverse these probabilities 
as nicely illustrated by the example: ǲ
be dead will be very high, but the probability that any dead person had been     ǳ ȋibid.). However, according to Gorard, researchers 
are often interested in whether the null-hypothesis is true, and are thus not 
testing the question they are actually interested in, but still often interpret it as if 
it does give information about whether the null-hypothesis is true. Moreover, by 
testing null-hypotheses, researchers ignore any prior knowledge to the topic. 
  
The second point made throughout the text relates to problems with the logic of 
the p-value. Specifically, Gorard maintains that there is a problem with the 
assumption behind the p-ǡ   ǲ      
design, and no measurement error, non-   ǳ (Gorard 
2016: 2.1). When there is not a completely random sample, for example due to 
missing data or because population data is used, Gorard states that the p-value is 
meaningless as no standard error can be calculated in these cases (ibid.: 3.1). 
Only when we are talking about a completely random sample and all 
assumptions behind the p-value are met, the significance test can be interpreted 
as the likelihood of finding a difference/relationship/pattern at least as strong as 
observed in the data. However, since the assumptions behind the p-value are so 
unrealistic in real-life according to Gorard, the calculated p-value is usually 
meaningless. Moreover, and related, he points out that to test no difference or 
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relationship or pattern at all (nil-null hypothesis) in the data does not seem to be 
useful, as usually one would not expect it to be completely zero in the population.  
 
Gorard adds a set of four examples so that readers could see these problems in 
practice. Thus Gorard makes his points using both logical and practical 
arguments in order to convince the reader. He encourages the reader to 
replicate, something that Nicholson and McCusker (2016) did and critique (and 
hence, we will not discuss these examples in this paper).   
 
Next to arguments against significance testing, Gorard also reviews past 
arguments as to why research practices have not changed. These practices 
constitute a ǲ  ǳǡ in which publications ǲǳ  significance        ǲ ǳ
(Gorard 2016: 6.5). Gorard argues that this culture of significance ensures that 
individuals keep using significance testing while no-one should.   
 
Crucially Gorard goes further than criticising what significance testing is, how it 
is used, and how it is seemingly embodied in research, reviewing and teaching. 
He argues that as a direct result of the flaws in the logic and use of significance 
tests, an unethical situation has arisen, referring to the argument as ǲ  ǳǤ   
 (2016) the issue on the merits of 
significance testing is settled and consequently it is ethically wrong to still 
perform or teach significance testingǣǲThe paper ends by arguing that this is no 
longer a technical or scientific issue but chiefly an ethical one.ǳ (ibid.: 1.1). 
According to him, research that uses significance testing is not only poor value 
for money (ibid.: 7.1) but also stands in the way of genuine scientific progress. ǲǳ
ǣ 
ǲǡ-review for 
publication in͒ their journals, teaching them to new researchers, or 
otherwise advocating them in any way, is part of a (hopefully) 
diminishing group causing untold real-life damage. Where they 
previously did so through ignorance, they should now cease. But anyone 
who continues with any of these actions despite reading the material in 
  ȋ Ȍ     Ǥǳ (Gorard 
2016: 8.4) 
In short, Gorard asserts that the debate for or against significance testing is 
settled and has problematic, even harmful, consequences. Therefore it is 
unethical to continue using and teaching it. 
YƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐZ> ?ƐĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐ 
As applied researchers (not statisticians) we are not commenting on the 
accuracy of the statements Ȃ which are widely debated and do not seem as clear-
cut as the author describes them. For readers interested in this, please read 
Nicholson and McCusker (2016). Instead, we argue that the conclusions and 
subsequent recommendations do not follow from the arguments presented. 
Rather than going through the arguments of Gorard one-by-one, we assess the 
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consequences of these arguments. We follow the same general line as above: (1) 
in response to the critique of the principles of significance testing based on p-
values we look at whether p-values are really the cause of the damage, (2) in 
response to the critique of how researchers use significance testing we look at 
the relative merit of p-values compared to alternatives, and (3) in response to 
the critique of the wider culture of significance, we discuss the tone in which the 
discussion is held.  
Are p-values the cause of damage? 
ǯ    scientific merit of p-values rests in parts on the ǲ  ǳ   null-hypothesis significance testing, but 
his key arguments relate to the misuses of p-values (for example, section 3.1). 
Whilst we acknowledge several of the pitfalls summarized in and exemplified by 
the article based on such misuses of p-values, we disagree both with the 
reasoning for and the corollary of the conclusion.  
 
The reasons against the p-value mentioned in the article (i.e. flawed logic and 
assumption of significance testing, observable misuse, and culture of 
significance; described in more detail in the previous section Damaging Real 
Lives (DRL)- revisited) do not provide the necessary link between the method 
used and damage done. Rather, it gives examples of research that failed to stand 
up to scrutiny or the test of time. However, this is and Ȃ we would argue Ȃ should 
be a normal part of the whole scientific endeavour. If anything this should be 
strengthened through post-publication peer-review and easy access to 
replication information (also see Andrew Gelman, 2013). Even though post-
publication peer-review may still not happen as often as we would like, journals 
like SAGE Open explicitly welcome this by stating in their Submission Guidelines ǲReaders and the academic community at large will then have the power to 
continue the peer review ǳ (SAGE Open 2016).  
 
Similarly as a corollary of his conclusions, Gorard seems to imply that damage 
will be done inevitably. Since significance testing does have appropriate 
interpretations and does provide information (see Wasserstein and Lazar 2016 
below), this appears to us overstated. This holds even if significance testing 
should only be used in the context of other analyses and (like all research) on 
basis of well-designed data collection efforts. Nicholson and McCusker (2016) 
describe the rationale of significance testing in detail. By contrast the claim that 
does follow from Gorarǯ is that researchers using, 
reviewing, and teaching significance testing, should use it appropriately and be 
aware that there might be better alternatives.  
The relative merit of significance testing 
Following from the conclusions drawn, Gorard argues that there is the logically 
and ethically compelling need to abandon significance testing. As he 
acknowledges the recommendation that significance testing should be 
abandoned has been made repeatedly, albeit not always as strongly formulated 
as Gorard does (see e.g. Hunter 1997; Halsey et al. 2015). Whilst we agree that 
there is misuse of p-values and that there is much to be improved on in both 
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research and teaching, we do not Ȃ at the moment - 
ǯ
that p-values should be abandoned altogether. Instead, it seems much more 
appropriate to follow Gerd Gigerenzerǯ (2004) recommendation that 
researchers should use and be taught   ǲ  ǳ. In this 
toolbox significance testing does have a place, but should be taught amongst 
other research strategies, such a stronger focus on thorough descriptive 
statistics, effect sizes, and Bayesian inferences. These different methods together 
will then inform us on the best evidence regarding a hypothesis. Our focus then 
would be on how to improve teaching and use of significance testing, rather than 
abandoning it. Gorard dismisses this approach outright. As applied researchers it 
seems immediately sensible to have more, rather than less analytical tools 
available. 
 
ǯ            
comparison with alternatives. Even though Gorard rightfully states that a lack of a    ǲ       ǳ
(Gorard, 2016: 6.6), it is important for applied researchers to know how they 
compare, even if only to the alternative of not using significance testing at all. 
Gorard rightly states there are many alternatives, some of which he himself 
proposed (Gorard and Gorard 2016), and this may be the reason he did not list 
these alternatives here. However, how should readers of his article be convinced 
that the alternatives to significance testing are indeed better when it is unclear 
what their relative merit is? Simply, we would need evidence that systematically 
better research is/would be produced when it is done in different ways. Then we 
would find it more convincing that abandoning e.g. p-values would lead to better 
research.  
 
Such comparison is particularly important, since the damaging outcomes 
mentioned by Gorard may also exist when p-values are not used. Let us look at 
just one of the issues with p-values: publication biases (see e.g. Egger et al. 1997 
on the impact of publication bias on accumulating information). Head et al. 
(2015) claim in their study on misuses of p-  ǲ  
with publication bias reoccur with other approaches, such as reporting effect 
sizes and their confidence intervals or Bayesian credible intervals. Publication 
biases are not a problem with p-values per se. They simply reflect the incentives ȋǤǤǡȌǤǳ(p.2). This suggests to us that we need 
to be wary and critical of any research, and that a simple solution as abandoning 
p-values may actually be no solution at all or as Ǥǯ(2015) asksǣ ǲ
the call to abandon p-values the ǫǳ 
 
More general, any method will have its problems, potential biases or give wrong 
results due to oversight or inappropriate usage of the method. Thus, in order to 
demonstrate the relative merit it should be demonstrated that alternative 
methods to significance testing do in fact produce superior results. An example 
for what we have in mind would be Howard et al. (2000) who juxtapose and 
compare conclusions of analyses using significance testing, a (Frequentist) meta-
analysis of studies and a number of Bayesian specifications. Such studies are 
necessary to assert more convincingly the relative merit of a method. 
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To summarise our arguments thus far; for us it neither follows that significance 
testing is the cause of the damages mentioned by Gorard, nor can we assess the 
relative merit of alternatives. We would be better able to judge and, we believe, 
more likely to change our practices (if necessary), if we were convinced that 
significance testing is the source of the problems and per definition better 
research would be done using different approaches or significance testing.  
Counterproductive language  
We mostly see the article itself as an intervention to improve scientific practice. 
The main goal of this paper does not seem to be to provide arguments in a 
debate on the usefulness of significance testing, hoping to persuade researchers 
to 
ǯ side of the argument, but rather to intervene in and change current 
research practices. Similarly, Trafimov et al. (2015) explicitly justified their ban 
of significance testing in the Journal of Basic and Applied Psychology as an 
attempt to improve research: ǲWe hope and anticipate that banning the NHSTP 
will have the effect of increasing the quality of submitted manuscripts by 
liberating authors from the stultified structure of NHSTP thinking thereby 
eliminating an important ǳȋǤǤ ?ȌǤeed, to 
change research practices strong interventions may be required. However, to us, 
it seems unlikely that this paper or the demand to ban significance testing are 
convincing given the extreme and uncompromising terms in which they are 
presented.  
 
To start with, Gorard alleges throughout the article an ǲbstinacyǳ on part of 
researchers, described as the unwillingness to change. This is so central to his ǡǲǳǤ For 
example, he dǲthe problem of the obstinacy of significance users cannot 
be logical or mathematical either. Significance testing derives from a 
psychological flaw. 'It does not tell us what we want to know, and we so much 
want to know what we want to know that, out of desperation, we nevertheless 
believe that it does!' (Cohen 1994). Schmidt (1996) considers it an addiction to 
false belief.ǳȋGorard 1996: 6.4). We wonder whether this is really the case and 
what would be a good indicator for obstinacy Ȃ other than disagreement with 
and uncertainty about the objections. An argument against obstinacy is that the 
research practice is changing, for example by an increasing focus on effect sizes 
and dealing with limitations of the data rather  Ǯǯ -values or 
mere statistical significance (e.g. American Psychological Association. 2010).  
 
Stating further that individuals are ǲdeliberatelyǳ causing damage is a very strong 
judgement, even if it is only targeted at the reader supposedly enlightened by the 
present article. This comes in addition to claiming a causal link between ǲǳmethods and poor research, a link we claim to seem problematic 
(see above). These judgments make us wary about the demands put on us as 
readers. We do not appreciate the way the argument does not want to convince 
but demands us to be convinced. This demand demotivates the interest in 
learning and understanding, and takes away from the energy needed to be better 
and more critical users of the statistical tool kit. As social researchers who use 
statistical methods to find answers to our substantive questions, we want to 
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learn from developments in statistics and increase our statistical understanding. 
However, this article seems to question our integrity in trying to do this. To us 
this counters the intention of improving research and teaching.  
 
Questioning the integrity of applied researchers based on their method use is 
especially problematic given that for each paper that says that there is no use of 
significance testing ȋ
ǯȌǡexist 
another paper defending significance testing (e.g. Murtaugh 2014), with some 
researchers agreeing (e.g. de Valpine 2014; Cumming 2014) and others not (e.g. 
Burnham and Anderson 2014; Morey et al. 2014). Thus, for us applied 
researchers it is not clear-cut how we should stand on this. We can see value in 
arguments from both sides. Therefore, we end up with a somewhat more 
practical question, namely the extent to which it substantially matters. To what 
degree do the different philosophies behind the approaches lead to different 
bodies of literature? As applied researchers, that is what we are most interested Ǥ
ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
does not seem to provide us with clarity on the substantive importance, but 
rather presents us with the conclusion that the debate is settled and that any 
uncertainty is due to obstinacy grounded in some psychological need for specific 
answers (see e.g. Sect 6.4). 
 
If we are not convinced by a paper, that demands change in our research 
practices, is there an alternative? An example for the way the critique could have 
been more fruitfully expressed and been a motivation to adapt, innovate, or 
adopt, is Ioannidisǯ     ǲ   	  	ǳ (2005). The overall claim is equally explicit, however it 
follows from the arguments presented and provides substantive amounts of 
suggestions for innovation, rather than stating that these are sufficiently 
documented elsewhere. Similarly, Greenland et al. (2016) provide a clear guide 
of common misinterpretations and how to avoid them, rather than dismissing p-
values all together and questioning the ethics of applied researchers. It provides, 
in our view, a nice overview on what you can and cannot say with p-value based 
tests and seems to be written with the intention of helping the field rather than 
condemning it. This is not a statement about whether the arguments are correct, 
but rather that it matters how arguments are presented, and to give examples of 
papers that have the potential to change and (hopefully) improve our work. 
 
In short, we are committed to improving how we work, but the issues do not 
appear to us as clear-cut as Gorard (2016) would have us believe. There are 
alternative forms of critical interventions with helpful suggestions, as for 
example made by Greenland et al. (2016) or Simmons et al. (2011). These do not 
attack our scientific integrity, and they are as a result more likely to be 
convincing to us. 
Towards improving social science research 
Fundamentally, we agree with the author on the need to improve research 
practices to avoid the misuses and poor research outcomes such as ones he 
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mentions. So far we disagreed with the identification of significance testing as 
the cause of the problem and the likely eff  
ǯ  
achieving more robust and innovative research as well as teaching practices. 
This begs the question wherein we would see the source of poor research and 
what would be effective interventions? 
 
The answer for use lies with a holistic view on the research process rather than Ǯǯȋ-value or uses 
other aspects of significance testing). It is well known from what is now called ǲ-ǳbias in estimated associations or effects is closely 
linked to study designs, their implementation and their reporting (Moheret al. 
1995, Schulz et al. 1995)[REFs]). ǡ   ǯ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
earlier response highlights the importance of explicitly formulating and stating 
alternative hypotheses for significance testing. 
 
 We will briefly describe a way of conceptualizing the common quantitative 
research process (similar to those in widely used social science research 
methods textbooks e.g. Bryman (2012) or Frequentist introductions to statistics 
e.g. Field (2013)). Readers should note that these deductive steps are also 
frequently followed in qualitative studies. 
A research process for quantitative data-analysis 
The quantitative research process can be simplified into six steps most readers 
will be familiar with: 
1) Reviewing existing literature  
2) Formulating or stating a hypothesis and planning research  
3) Collection or selection of data 
4) Description and analysis of the data 
5) Robustness checks 
6) Reporting and documenting  
In our eyes, poor research can originate at any of these six stages and thus in our 
view, the focus should not just be on the analysis of data, but rather on the full 
research process. For example, taking the critique against misrepresenting the p-
value seriously also means that we should be more critical when reviewing 
previous literature, inspecting the entire context and research (as far as 
possible) and critically interpreting the presented statistics ourselves and the 
conclusions as offered in the paper (cf. Greenland et al. 2016). The step of 
formulating and stating hypotheses is not only generally crucial, but also central 
for the appropriate use of statistical methods and their unbiased reporting, 
together with pre-planning of data-collection (or Ȃselection) and analyses 
(Wagenmakers et al. 2012). Moreover, we believe in the importance of 
robustness checks and also reporting these robustness checks. This enables the 
reader to assess how much findings are dependent on specific method choices. 
Examples for robustness checks relate to model-assumptions (such as 
unobserved heterogeneity (Karlson 2011)) and increasingly part of new 
statistical procedures (e.g. sensitivity analyses for mediation (Imai et al 2010)) It 
is of course important to report all robustness checks that the researcher has 
done; not only the ones in favour of the result presented in the paper. This would 
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give us information for the best evidence regarding a hypothesis. Finally, whilst 
the ordering of the research steps is no panacea, it is nonetheless a potential 
source of bias, e.g. if researchers return to their data-collection after an initial 
analysis. Correspondingly, trial registrations or analysis plan pre-publication are 
increasingly becoming important (Monogan 2013, also see for a critical 
appraisal, Scott et al 2015). 
 
By contrast, 
ǯsignificance testing plays 
in all of the steps of the research process. He focuses on one step only; the 
analysis of the data. Nevertheless, he uses problems from other steps, such as 
data-collection, to outright dismiss the validity of the analytical logic (Gorard 
2016: 3.1). His critique seems strangely detached from the other dimensions of 
the research process.  
 
In our opinion, taking the critique seriously for the whole research process will 
improve scientific practice. By increasingly reporting the whole research 
process, we think we would get a better understanding of the results presented 
in the limited space of a published article and we perceive this more fruitful than 
banning significance testing. Our readers might wonder whether this is the case, 
but we would maintain that fuller reporting would provide an alternative against 
a ban, and would allow assessment of any effects as well as a sense of the relative 
merit of various methods, something we claimed earlier to be necessary.  
 
Readers may say that it is not possible to report more fully as there is a limit to 
what can be placed in a journal article. However, it is increasingly possible to 
provide web appendices for published articles, and this would allow for an 
increase in the information available to interested readers, not only to assess the 
best evidence there is for (or against) a certain hypothesis, but also on the 
process by which it was generated. For example, the journal Work, Employment, 
and Society, ǯ
ǣǲauthors are strongly 
encouraged to include additional results and analysis in an appendix submitted   ǳ (British Sociological Association 2014). Even if a journal 
does not accept a web appendix, researchers may think about publishing a web 
appendix on their own website or stable repositories (see e.g. Open Science 
Framework: <www.osf.io>).  
Using the debate on significance testing to innovate the 
research process 
It is easy to argue that broadening the debate to include the whole research ǲǳǲǳǤwe will now briefly look at two 
alternative interventions to improve research that have been proposed 
previously. Moreover we also point to the need to look at the whole research 
process again. The first is specifically concerned with significance testing but 
embeds it in the wider research process, the second acknowledges explicitly the 
need to change the whole research process.  
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Alternative 1 ʹ Improving on p-value use. 
The first alternative is the recent statement by the American Statistical 
Association in response to the most recent wave of discussion about significance 
testing and specifically the use of p-values (Wasserstein and Lazar 2016). The 
statement aims to clarify the correct use of p-values, which as far as we 
understand challenges the outright dismissal of significance testing argue that ǲ      - even when used as their advocates ǳ (Gorard 2016: 8.3). As such it seems to us a better intervention to 
improve scientific practice. The five central points of the statement are listed 
below. 
 ǲ ?Ǥ-values can indicate how incompatible the data are with a 
specified statistical model. 
2. P-values do not measure the probability that the studied 
hypothesis is true, or the probability that the data were 
produced by random chance alone. 
3. Scientific conclusions and business or policy decisions 
should not be based only on whether a p-value passes a 
specific threshold. 
4. Proper inference requires full reporting and transparency 
5. A p-value, or statistical significance, does not measure the          Ǥǳ (Wasserstein 
and Lazar 2016) 
 
The third and fourth point apply essentially to any quantitative research and 
thus provide the broader focus on the overall research process. Conclusions and 
decisions should correspond to all aspects of the research process, its complete 
and open documentation, and ultimately should be the result of replications, 
meta-analysis (but see Egger et al (1997) on bias in meta-analyses) or a more 
general summary of evidence. 
 
By contrast the other points highlight the analytical need for several measures;  Ǯǯ
arrive at a conclusion.  
Alternative 2 - Improving replicability and synthesis through better 
reporting 
ǯrelative merit and being 
a poor intervention to improve research practice. The second particularly 
powerful alternative way of achieving improved research practice is the 
requirement for transparent reporting, judged against the standard of 
replicability and the ability of knowledge accumulation to better understand the 
best evidence for or against a hypothesis, irrespective of analysis method used.  
 
Key examples for this are journals that require the deposit of data and syntax 
(e.g., American Economic Association 2016), as well as requiring the use of 
reporting guidelines (such as CONSORT (Moher, Schulz, and Altman 2001) or 
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STROBE (von Elm et al. 2007)Ȍǡ       ǯ 
design.  
 
These requirements for standardized reporting provide a more fruitful social 
process of changing current research practice. Moreover they can be judged 
against the standard of replicability. Genuine transparency rather than a 
different analysis method enables knowledge accumulation, the lack of which 
Gorard laments and blames on significance testing. This is a point Gorard himself 
is well-aware given his work on research synthesis methods such as systematic 
reviews and meta-analyses (e.g. Gorard and Taylor 2004).  
        
ǯ    significance 
testing and the two alternative interventions mentioned here in their Ǥ ǡ       ǲǳ   d 
through the degree by which transparency and replicability are achieved, the 
relative merit of these two interventions should be clear. Transparency also 
would ensure that mistakes and wrong interpretations of significance testing 
could be spotted, corrected, and results be compared to alternative not 
significance-based analyses. 
 
Our objection to an outright ban of significance testing is thus, we believe, not 
based on obstinacy. Rather, since such ban only aims at one aspect of the 
research process, we argue it is too simplistic and does not contribute to being 
more critical researchers and increasing replicability and transparency. We 
therefore do not believe it ultimately will bring about the positive changes 
Gorard appears to want to achieve.ii,iii By contrast, we believe that by clarifying 
how to use significance testing and by demanding detailed documentation of its 
application (or a more general detailed and standardized reporting of the whole 
research process) the research community ǲǳ
explicitly increasing transparency and replicability and nudging researchers 
towards being more critical on their own work. 
Reviewing and Teaching 
ǯsignificance testing in research practices, but also 
aims at reviewing and teaching practices in relation to significance testing Ȃǲallowing them to pass peer-review for publication in their journals, teaching them 
to new researchersǳ(Gorard 2016: 8.4). Two brief responses to this. 
We already expressed how a ban of significance testing from journals is not likely 
to result in the wished for improvement since it ignores the wider research    ǯ     
would be more effective. Consequently, reviewers, even those not well-versed in 
quantitative methods, should judge any manuscript based on reporting 
guidelines with the aim to improve transparency and replicability. They should 
require it in their responses, and journals should focus on this, rather than on a 
ban of significance testing. Moreover, they should pay special attention on 
whether p-values are correctly interpreted and that only claims are made that 
are warranted by the analyses done.  
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Teaching should continue to introduce and provide training in significance 
testing techniques, as part of a broad statistical training to equip students with a 
large analytical toolbox. However, we also want our students to be critical of 
what they are doing and rather than separating these techniques from both 
substantive courses and training focus on research design, there is a need for 
integration. iv Learning to use a variety of analytical tools entails learning about 
the whole research process they are embedded in and crucially how to report 
them. The challenge for us (and others who teach quantitative methods) is 
teaching the methods in a way that is understandable and that students (feel 
they) can apply as well as at the same time not losing important nuances in what 
you can and cannot say with the methods.  
Teaching quantitative methods also provides opportunities to directly improve 
replicability. And a small but powerful change in our eyes could be a widespread 
use of replication assignments, for example as master thesis (e.g. Janz 2016). 
That way replication gets a more important role in academia and is embedded in 
a new generation of academics, and ultimately raises the bar for the quality of 
reported research. 
Concluding remarks 
Gorard (2016) provides a very vocal critique of current statistical practices, with 
pointed statements about for example research programs in epidemiology. 
Throughout our comment, we highlighted the need to see the discussion as an 
impetus for research innovation and improvement. Gorard makes it clear that 
this is his aim, too, albeit through removing a tool from the researcherǯ 
and without providing evidence as to the relative merit of alternatives of 
abandoning significance testing:   
ǲ      (above) would be to force 
researchers to consider and report a much wider range of issues Ȃ such as 
the possible importance and methodological soundness of any findings ȋǥȌ. 
What is needed is some idea of the scale of any difference (or pattern or 
trend), the methodological limitations underlying it, and a judgement about 
its substantive importance (and perhaps also the cost-effectiveness of 
ǯȌǤǮǯ
evaluationǳ (Gorard 2016: 3.4). 
 
In our opinion, this is the more important message of this article and these 
points, rather than banning significance testing, should generally be the focus of 
how to improve statistical research practices. And indeed, we believe that the 
field is already moving in that direction. The alternatives mentioned above 
address the whole research process and can be explicitly assessed for their 
relative merit in improving transparency and replicability. Increasingly, journals 
provide reporting guidelines, systematic reviews are done with explicit tests for 
publication biases (which consists of more than just an issue of statistical 
significance!), sometimes study and analysis preregistration is required, and we 
can see a start of a replication culture (Bohannon 2015; Camerer et al. 2016). 
These are important developments and seem more powerful than a ban of a 
single analytical approach.  
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The again invigorated debate of significance testing, particularly in the social 
sciences, means that analyses will have to be more robust and better reported. 
We welcome this development. It will provide challenges for researchers, 
reviewers, and teachers of quantitative methods alike and it is unlikely that the 
discussion on how to improve scientific practice will be solved soon.  
 
To conclude, we believe in expanding our statistical toolbox as well as learning 
how to use each tool appropriately. We believe that it is through a broader 
understanding of statistical methods that we can improve our research, 
reviewing, and teaching; not by completely disregarding one tool. Moreover, the 
improvements in the research process should not be limited to the analytical 
strategy chosen, but should encompass the full research process, including 
reviewing existing literature, hypothesis formulation, data-collection or -
selection, robustness checks, and reporting and replication.  
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Endnotes 
 
i References to the original article are made with regard to sections in the online 
document, rather than pages. 
ii It would be in our eyes an interesting test to see whether in general the quality 
of research has improved in journals banning significance testing. We would be 
skeptic that it has as it is only one and probably a less important aspect of the 
overall research process. 
iii        ǯ (2015)    ǯ
(2014) proposition to ban significance testing. 
iv The step-change in quantitative methods teaching (Q-Step) initiative at fifteen 
UK universities, for example does this through embedding methods teaching in 
substantive course, e.g. www.kent.ac.uk/qstep/integration.html 
